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ABSTRACT
When considering the legal implications of monitoring and surveillance in the workplace, the question
may be asked why companies deploy computer surveillance and monitoring in the first place. Several
reasons may be put forward to justify why more than 80% of all major American firms monitor
employee e-mails and Internet usage. However, what most companies forget is the fact that the
absence or presence of monitoring and surveillance activities in a company holds serious legal
consequences for companies. From the discussion in this paper it will become apparent that there is a
vast difference in how most countries approach this subject matter. On the one hand America does not
afford any employee a reasonable expectation of privacy when it comes to the use of corporate
computer resources and systems, while in contrast to this position the United Kingdom goes out of its
way to protect each employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy. This paper will not only investigate
the different approaches followed by some of the world-leader, but will also investigate the legal
consequences embedded in each approach. This paper will ultimately enable the reader to judge for
himself/herself which approach his/her country should follow while being fully informed of the legal
consequences attached to the chosen approach.
Keywords: information security, legal issues, monitoring and surveillance, privacy
1. INTRODUCTION
There are various legal issues that are embedded in workplace monitoring and surveillance. Mainly,
there are two main schools of thought that exist on this subject-matter. On the one hand there are those
that argue that employers are the owners of the computing equipment, resources and systems and they
therefore have a right to monitor how their property is being used, and then there are those that argue
that employees’ rights to privacy should weigh more than that of any employer.
When examining the relevant statutes, case law and regulations it becomes apparent that in most
jurisdictions a notice requirement exist, but this notice of surveillance and/or monitoring is rarely
sufficient. This paper will examine Internet and e-mail related surveillance and monitoring in the
workplace from a comparative legal perspective. Ultimately, the aim of this paper is to inform readers
of the current legal position existing in some of the most important jurisdictions world-wide, thereby
enabling readers to make up their own minds on which approach their country should follow, and
enabling readers to understand the legal consequences embedded in each approach.
2. JUSTIFICATION FOR MONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE IN THE WORKPLACE
“Surveillance technology is neither inherently bad nor good, but …there is both good and bad
surveillance.”
When considering the legal implications of monitoring and surveillance in the workplace, the question
may be asked why companies deploy computer surveillance and monitoring in the first place. Several
reasons may be put forward to justify why more than 80% of all major American firms monitor
employee e-mails and Internet usage. The first reason centers around employee productivity. As a
result of the Internet and e-mails employee productivity has decreased. This is a major concern for
employers, as Internet use surveys continue to indicate that the majority of employees spend anywhere
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from 10 minutes to an hour every day surfing sites unrelated to doing their jobs – using their work
computers to read virtual newspapers, or go online shopping, or even viewing naked woman.
Secondly, network performance must be considered. Employees that download video or audio files
from the Internet are taking up a great amount of bandwidth. It therefore makes sense that employers
spend money on Internet monitoring tools rather than on increasing the bandwidth. Thirdly, the very
real risk exists that a company may be held legally liable for the online activities performed by its
employees. For example the brokerage firm of Morgan Stanley was exposed to $70 million lawsuit
because of racist jokes that appeared on the company’s e-mail system. Also, Dow Chemicals
discovered through computer surveillance technologies that 50 employees were using the company’s
computers to store and send sexual or violent images, resulting in the termination of all of these
employees. Fourthly, all companies are faced with the ever present ‘insider threat’. It is therefore
understandable that companies will go to great lengths to protect the confidentiality of its corporate
information and trade secrets even if it is from its own employees.
3. MONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE – THE CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE
3.1 Introduction
It is generally accepted that in terms of Canadian law employees enjoy very little to no privacy
protection in the workplace when it comes to computer and email surveillance. MacIsaac observes:
“…many employers consider electronic mail sent and received using company computer equipment
and stored on company computer networks to be the property of the employer. From the employer’s
perspective this is a business resource paid for by the employer and is to be used only for business
purposes. Therefore, e-mail messages and telephone conversations made on behalf of the employee in
the course of business should be made available for review for legitimate business and security
reasons. For these reasons, an employee acting on behalf of their employer should have no reasonable
expectation of privacy”.
This view was supported in an arbitration case in which a college lab technician’s employment was
terminated after sending unwarranted allegation against other employees to the campus-wide email
message board. The case finding reiterated the principle of ‘office e-mail: no reasonable expectation of
privacy’.
Today however, a definite move towards finding a balance between monitoring and privacy may be
observed in Canadian law. As stated in the previous chapter, the most important source of privacy
protection in Canada is found in the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act
(PIPEDA) 2000. PIPEDA recognizes the importance of finding a balance between an employer’s need
to collect certain personal data, and an employee’s need for privacy protection. The Act states: “…the
purpose of this part [Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector] is to establish, in an era
in which technology increasingly facilitates the circulation and exchange of information, rules to
govern the collection, use and disclosure of personal information in a manner that recognizes the rights
to privacy of individuals with respect to their personal information and the need of organizations to
collect, use or disclose personal information for purposes that a reasonable person would consider
appropriate in the circumstances”.
3.2 Regulatory framework – PIPEDA
When evaluating employee surveillance within the ambit of PIPEDA the following observations
should be made:
(i)

Firstly, the provision in PIPEDA of ‘appropriate purpose’ limits the use, collection and
disclosure of personal information to situations which a reasonable person would deem to
be appropriate under the circumstances. Within the ambit of the workplace this would
imply that mere consent by an employee to surveillance is no longer sufficient as the
provision clearly states that a reasonable person must consider the circumstances to be
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appropriate. Therefore it may be argued that where surveillance takes place under the
façade of creating and maintaining a harassment free and safe working environment, it is
likely that the courts will declare such surveillance to be unlawful because of the absence
of a known issue in response to which surveillance takes place;
(ii)

Secondly, PIPEDA requires of companies must appoint a privacy officer who will be
responsible for ensuring that the company complies with its privacy obligations. The act
suggests that the collection of personal workplace data no longer falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the company’s technology personnel, but the privacy officer must also be
involved;

(iii)

Thirdly, the act contains specific provision relating to the notification of employees of
workplace surveillance. It is expected of companies to: (a) identify the purpose for which
the data is being collected; (b) obtain consent prior to collection; and (c) to limit collection
of personal data to that which is necessary for the purposes as set out by the company. The
aim of these provisions are to: (a) limit the type of information a company may collect;
and (b) demand of companies to inform their employees of the surveillance policies of the
company. The act does however contain an exception to the general rule that notice must
be given to employees before surveillance may take place. Section 7(1) (b) of the act
states:
“…an organization may collect personal information without the knowledge
or consent of the individual only if …it is reasonable to expect that the collection with the
knowledge or consent of the individual would compromise the availability or the accuracy
of the information and the collection is reasonable for purposes related to investigating a
breach of an agreement or a contravention of laws of Canada or a province”.

(iv)

Fourthly, the Act requires that “personal information shall be retained only as long as is
necessary for the fulfillment of the [identified] purpose”. Therefore, this provision
regulates an employers’ use of information after collection thereof. Employers are
furthermore prohibited from keeping personal information for an unlimited time period.
3.3 Employee monitoring and surveillance – The present position in Canada

The Canadian court’s commitment to privacy protection has come to the fore in recent years. In 1999
the B.C. Supreme Court ruled in the Weir case that e-mail does enjoy a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Also in that same year the case of Pacific Northwest Herb Corp v Thompson 1999 BCJ No
2772 came before the court. Thompson was an employee of Pacific Northwest who used the
company’s computer in his home for business and personal purposes. After termination of his
employment he continued using the company computer for personal purposes. Amongst the
documents on the computer was a file containing documents relating to the wrongful dismissal action
he was planning to institute against Pacific Northwest. Before returning the computer to the company
he hired a computer consultant to erase all the data on the hard drive. His attempts were however
unsuccessful, and after returning the computer to Pacific Northwest the company was able to restore
the data. Thompson sought an interdict to prevent Pacific Northwest to exploit the data, claiming that
his right to privacy and solicitor-client privilege has been infringed. The judge in this case concluded
that Thompson had a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding documents that were created for
personal use.
In R v Duarte 1990 1 SCR 945 the judge concluded that although the right to privacy was not absolute,
it must be “judged against what is reasonable in the circumstances and, amongst other things, is
dependant upon competing interests such as the relationship between the parties”. The court went even
further and stated that in order to determine what would amount to ‘reasonable in the circumstances’,
three considerations must be kept in mind: (i) whether it was reasonable to request surveillance; (ii)
whether the surveillance was conducted in a reasonable manner; and (iii) whether any other
alternatives to surveillance were available to the employer.
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This case has been approved in many other cases. In St Mary’s Hospital and HEU 64 LAC (4th) 382 an
electrician discovered a video camera in the ceiling of a manager’s office. The local union was
outraged at this surreptitious surveillance, and filed a grievance. The arbitrator found in this case that
surveillance can be characterized in three ways: (a) benign surveillance which would entail
surveillance done for the benefit of the employee; (b) security surveillance which has as its main aim
to ensure the protection of employees as well as the employer; and (c) surreptitious surveillance which
represents the most intrusive force of surveillance. The arbitrator was of the opinion that this form of
surveillance requires strict justification. Furthermore, in Re Toronto Transit Commission and ATU
Loc 113 (Belsito) 95 LAC (4th) 402 and in New Flyer Industries Ltd and CAW Canada Loc 3003
(Mogg) 85 LAC (4th) 304 the court acknowledged that “surveillance by an employer may, in certain
circumstances, infringe upon an employee’s right to privacy to an unreasonable extent”.
The Privacy Commissioner has made his views on workplace surveillance, the privacy of e-mails and
the reasonable expectation of privacy clear. The Commissioner states: “I don’t accept that the
protection necessarily translates into wholesale surveillance of e-mails or computer use. We accept
that there are stringent limits on an employer’s rights to read employees’ mail, eavesdrop on their
telephone calls or rifle through their desk drawers. I think we have to look closely at e-mail
communications to see what principles should apply there as well”.
The Commissioner went on to comment on the practice of some companies to state in their email
policies that the employees should have no reasonable expectation of privacy when using the e-mail
systems: “[t]he law of privacy has developed around the notion of the ‘reasonable expectation’; one of
the ways that the courts determine whether privacy has been violated has been to determine first
whether a person could have reasonable expected privacy in a particular place and time. But I don’t
agree that it follows that an employee’s or anyone’s privacy can be simply eradicated by telling them
not to expect any. While management has the right and the responsibility to manage, it has to operate
within limits, including respect for fundamental rights. It is not for management alone to determine
whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable”.
Therefore, a clear shift in the pendulum in Canadian law may be observed. In the past emphasis was
placed on whether or not the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy, today emphasis is
placed on the question whether or not the surveillance is reasonable. It is now accepted that workplace
surveillance, whether it be by video camera, server-side computer monitoring, or client-side computer
monitoring, cannot be justified by simply giving notice to an employee. An investigation will have to
be launched into the reasonableness of the surveillance.
Geist identifies six factors which may be taken into consideration when wanting to determine whether
or not the computer or email surveillance is reasonable in terms of Canadian law:
(i)

The target of the surveillance – Consideration must be given to whether computer
surveillance will be conducted across the company as a whole or if it will be targeted
against specific employees;

(ii)

Purpose of the surveillance – Companies that install new surveillance technologies must
be able to show how these technologies support their objectives;

(iii)

Alternatives to surveillance – It is suggested that other surveillance technologies that are
much less intrusive on an employee’s right to privacy in the workplace must first be
investigated;

(iv)

The surveillance technology – The choice of surveillance technology must be reasonable
taking into account the purpose of the surveillance;

(v)

Adequacy of notice – in terms of the Criminal Code as well as PIPEDA consent must be
obtained from the employee. This would entail not merely informing employees of the
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fact of surveillance but also giving them an accurate description of the company’s
surveillance practices; and
(vi)

The implementation of the surveillance activities – the company will have to ensure that
unauthorized persons are not able to gain access to the surveillance information.
3.4 Conclusion

From the above it may be concluded that in Canadian law neither the right to privacy nor the right to
surveillance is absolute. Canadian law attempts to find a balance between the interest of the employer
and the rights of the employee by focusing on the reasonableness of the surveillance.
4. MONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE IN THE WORKPLACE – THE AMERICAN
POSITION
4.1 Introduction
At present the position in America is that no employee has any constitutional, federal or common law
legal remedies for redress where an employer abuses email and Internet monitoring and surveillance.
4.2 Constitutional protection against employee monitoring and surveillance


Federal constitution

The US Constitution does not afford anyone the right to privacy expressly. The constitution only
recognizes privacy as a penumbral theory. This explains why the right to privacy has not been
extended to protect an employee’s electronic communications. Cherminisky observes: “[m]ost
Americans would be surprised to learn that there is no right to privacy granted in the United States
Constitution. The Fourth Amendment protects privacy in limiting police searches and arrests, but
privacy in terms of autonomy and the right to be left alone by the government is not mentioned in the
text of the Constitution”.
Consequently, the present position in the United States is that employees, in a private workplace, are
not afforded any protection against electronic surveillance because of the doctrine of state
surveillance. In contrast to this public sector employees have a certain degree of constitutional
protection against abusive monitoring in the workplace. Included in this would be the right to
reasonable searches and seizures. American courts have even gone so far as to state that public sector
employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding their emails and Internet
communications.
 State constitution
Privacy protection in respect of state constitutions vary to a great extend. It is however important to
bear in mind that to date no court has extended state constitutional protection of privacy to email
monitoring and surveillance in the workplace. Most states do not require employers to give employees
any form of notification when monitoring their emails and Internet communications.
4.3 Federal legislation – The ECPA


Title I of the ECPA – The Federal Wiretap Statute

In terms Title I (The federal Wiretap Act) of the ECPA interception of electronic communications
such as telephone calls and emails are prohibited. The Act prohibits the following activities:
(i)

intercepting or endeavoring to intercept electronic communications;

(ii)

disclosing or endeavoring to disclose intercepted electronic communications; and

(iii)

using the content of intercepted information.

It therefore follows that if an employer intercepts email or monitors Internet communications of
his/her employee, his actions will fall within the ambit of the ECPA. The following important
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observations must be, made in this regard. First, it is required that the interception and/or monitoring
should be made intentional. Secondly, the content of the communication is only protected as long as it
is under transmission. Consequently, Title I will not be applicable where an employer searches an
employee’s stored emails.
Two exceptions are contained in Title I. First, the ECPA allows service provides to intercept and
disclose electronic communication if either the sender or the receiver consented thereto, or the
‘ordinary course of business’ exception can be applied. The latter exception however, proves to be
highly problematic.
In order for an employer to make use of the ‘ordinary course of business exception’ it is expected of
the employer to proof the following:
(i)

the device used to intercept the electronic communication is “a telephone or telegraphic
instrument, equipment or facility, or a…component thereof,” provided or installed by the
employer himself/herself; and

(ii)

that the specific device is employed by the employer in his/her ordinary course of
business.

It must furthermore be borne in mind that an employer is only authorized to intercept the
communication for long enough to determine the nature of the conversation. Once the employer has
determined that the communication is personal in nature he/she must immediately terminate
interception.


Title II of the ECPA – The Stored Communications Act of 2005

Title II of the ECPA (The Stored Communications Act of 2005) provides guidance when wanting to
obtain access or disclosure of electronic communication, such as messages left on a voice machine,
once in storage. A violation of Title II will result in civil liability for any person who (a) intentionally
accesses, without authorization, a facility through which an electronic communication service is
provided; or (b) intentionally exceeds an authorization access and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents
authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage.
As soon as an electronic message has been stored the SCA will regulate the situation. This is
irrespective of the length of storage.
When considering the operation of Title II it becomes evident that emails are generally considered to
be stored communications in terms of American law. Consequently, employers are authorized to
access electronic communications under this title. However, this means that Title I of the ECPA is in
actual fact rendered useless.
From the above discussion it may be concluded that in virtually all cases decided by American courts
in the last decade it has been decided that employees do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
In some instance American courts have gone so far as to validate employee monitoring even where
advance warning was not given to the employee. The following American case law supports this
statement:


Employee monitoring and surveillance without notice

In Restuccia v Burk Technology 1996 Mass Super LEXIS 367 (Super Ct (Mass) Aug 13 1996) the
employer neglected to have an email policy stating the possibility that emails can be monitored, stored
on back-up or that emails may not be used for personal messages. When viewing back-up files the
employer discovered email messages containing nick-names for the president of the company and
references to an extra-marital affair with another employee. The president of the company terminated
the two employee’s employment based on the fact that they were using the email system too much.
The ex-employees argued that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy because of the fact that
they had personal passwords to access their message system. the court found that the president’s action
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of reading the email messages on the back-up system constituted an infringement of the privacy of the
ex employees. In this case the ex-employees were successful in their claim, but in every other
workplace interception case the defendant’s were awarded summary judgment in a claim that
workplace surveillance invaded a plaintiff’s right of privacy.
Furthermore, in Smyth v Pillsbury Co 914 F Supp 97 (ED Pa 1996) an employee was fired after
having made negative comments about a sales manager in an email. The email contained treats to “kill
the backstabbing bastards”. The company had, on various occasions, assured its employees that all
emails are confidential and privileged. The company based the termination of employment on
“transmitting what it deemed to be inappropriate and unprofessional comments over the company’s email system”. The employee however argued wrongful termination. The federal court decided that the
termination of the employee was justified, as the employee had no expectation of privacy in the
employer’s email system. The court went even further to state that even if the employee had a
reasonable expectation of privacy it would not amount to invasion of privacy if an employer
intercepted messages on a system it owned.
Moreover, in McLaren v Microsoft Corp Microsoft 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 4103, 1999 WL 339015
(Tex. Ct. App. 1999) accessed personal folders on a network in order to investigate claims of sexual
harassment. The employee claimed that Microsoft had violated his reasonable expectation of privacy.
The emails that Microsoft eventually uncovered did provide evidence that the employee was engaging
in a “systematic pattern of sexual harassment”. The court held that it was not going to recognise a
cause of action for invasion of privacy, even though the employee had a special password and the files
were marked ‘personal’. The court stated in this case that the decisive factor was that the computer
was the property of the employer and formed part of the computer environment. The court furthermore
stated that because of the fact that the folder was transmitted over the network, it was inevitable that it
would be accessed by a third party at some stage. Consequently, the plaintiff had no expectation of
privacy with regards to the files marked ‘private’.


Employee monitoring and surveillance with notice

By implementing an email and Internet policy companies safeguard themselves against any privacybased claims by employees. In Bourke v Nissan Motor Corp Nissan California Court of Appeals,
Second Appellate District, Case No. B068705 (July 1996) made every employee sign a waiver form in
which they had to acknowledge that they understood that Nissan’s email system was to be used for
business purposes exclusively. In this case the court decided that this waiver was fatal to any claim an
employee can bring based on invasion of privacy.
Furthermore, in Garrity v John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company 2002 US Dist. LEXIS 8343
(D Mass. May 7, 2000) two long term employees forwarded sexually explicit jokes to third parties.
One of their co-workers complaint after receiving such an email. The company had an email policy
providing that “messages that are defamatory, abusive, obscene, profane, sexually orientated,
threatening or racially offensive” are prohibited. The two woman’s employment was consequently
terminated. The court dismissed the privacy based action brought by the two women stating that
employees do not have any reasonable expectation of privacy pertaining to work related emails. The
court furthermore made a very harsh statement by stating that the fact that the company had an email
policy was irrelevant. The court concluded that the employer’s right and duty to limit harassment in
the workplace outweighs any rights the plaintiffs’ though they had in respect of privacy.
Moreover, in Thygeson v US Bancorp 2004 US Dist. LEXIS 18863 (D. Ore. Sept 15, 2004) the bank’s
employment handbook stated that employees were prohibited to “use US Bancorp computer resources
for personal business”. The handbook furthermore stated “do not access inappropriate internet sites
and do not send emails which may be perceived as offensive, intimidating, or hostile or that are in
violation of Company policy”. One of Bancorp’s employees were spending more than four hours a day
visiting non work related Internet sites on his work computer. The company furthermore discovered
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that he was viewing “inappropriate emails containing pictures of nudity and sexually offensive jokes”.
The employee was subsequently fired. The employee brought an action against the bank arguing that
they invaded his privacy as well as the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) by
firing him without awarding him severance pay. The court found that the employee had no expectation
of privacy when his employer accessed the files on its network that the plaintiff saved using a personal
password, then this employee had no expectation of privacy in his email ‘merely labeled personal’
without even creating a password.
4.4 Conclusion
The conclusion must be reached that when it comes the subject matter of workplace monitoring and
surveillance, all indication are that it is pro-employer. Employees have no real remedies for the abuse
of email and Internet monitoring and surveillance. Furthermore almost all courts in America have held
that employees do not have a right to privacy in the workplace. Courts continue to justify their position
by stating that since business computers are the property of its employers, employers have an
unfettered right to monitor its usage. American employees will furthermore be unable to find any relief
in the US constitution, common law of torts or the ECPA.
5. MONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE IN THE WORKPLACE – THE UNITED
KINGDOM’S PERSPECTIVE
5.1 Introduction
The United Kingdom is a member of the European Union. Consequently, the United Kingdom has to
comply with EU directives on the subject matter of employee monitoring and surveillance. In terms of
the European Community Treaty it is expected of the UK to propagate enabling legislation which will
give effect to the fundamental rights as set forth in the Council of Europe Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 (ECHR) and legislation of the EU.
5.2 Regulatory framework
Because of the operation of the doctrine of vicarious liability, the UK government has accepted that
employers do have the right to monitor their employees. However, in contrast to the approach
followed in America, the right of an employer to monitor is balanced with the employee’s right to
privacy.
The legal framework for Internet monitoring in the United Kingdom comprises of five main statutes
and almost no case law on the subject matter.


The Data Protection Act of 1998

All British employers must comply with the United Kingdom’s implementation of the European
Union Directive on Data Protection in the form of the Data Protection Act of 1998. In terms of the
DPA data controllers are compelled not only to inform the employee of the monitoring system, but
also to protect the data processed in accordance with the Data Protection Principles (DPA).
In terms of the DPA electronic monitoring has to comply with the following requirements:
(i)

the monitoring must be lawful and fair;

(ii)

the monitoring program must be necessary; and

(iii)

the monitoring program must be proportionate to achieving the legitimate business
objective while simultaneously protecting the right to privacy of the individual employee.

In terms of the DPA only one exception exists regarding the notification requirement: if electronic
monitoring is done with the aim of preventing a specific crime the employer will not have to adhere to
the notice requirement.
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The Human Rights Act of 1998

The DPA furthermore takes cognizance of the Human Rights Act of 1998. In terms of this Act the
privacy of any private communication, telephone conversation and email communication is expressly
protected. It is important to observe that the Human Rights Act draws a distinction between public and
private sector employers. If the employer falls within the ambit of the public sector, the employee will
have a direct cause of action in terms of the Human Rights Act.
Employees in the United Kingdom enjoy further protection in terms of article 8 of the ECHR. In terms
of article 8 of the Act “everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home, and
his correspondence”. This convention affords private employees with a legal remedy to challenge
abusive monitoring practices. The European Court of Human Rights has extended the definition of
‘private life and correspondence’ to include business relations, emails and other electronic
communications.
Furthermore, the United Kingdom’s chief regulatory agency (OFTEL) issued in 1999 Guidance on
recording on private conversations. The aim of these guidelines was to provide employers with
guidelines when wanting to implement electronic monitoring without violating their employees’ right
to privacy.


The Regulation of Investigative Powers Act of 2000

In terms of this Act it is a criminal offence to intercept data without authorization. It is however
important to keep in mind that RIP is not applicable to private telecommunications systems such as
intranets and Virtual Private Networks. Moreover, no provision in RIP addresses electronic monitoring
in the workplace expressly. In general employers are permitted to intercept emails and to monitor
Internet access as long as both the sender and receiver agree thereto. Employers may furthermore only
intercept emails and Internet communications if the monitoring is conducted in order to carry out the
employer’s business activities.


The Lawful Business Practice Regulations (LBPR)

This Act governs the rights and responsibilities of businesses relating to monitoring electronic
communications. This Act provides certain exceptions to the RIP Act. The most important of which is
that monitoring without compliance with the notice requirement can take place. In terms of this
exception companies may monitor and keep record of Internet communications in order to comply and
adhere to regulatory or self-regulatory practices and procedures. There is however a limitation placed
on monitoring activities by providing that such activities may only take place if a company employee
uses the computer system within the scope of his/her duties. Furthermore, in terms of the LBPR
interception without consent is authorized if the interception has one or more of the following
purposes:
(i)

to establish the existence of facts, to ascertain compliance with the regulatory or selfregulatory practices or procedures (quality control and training);

(ii)

to prevent or detect crimes;

(iii)

to investigate or detect unauthorized use of telecommunication systems;

(iv)

to secure; and

(v)

to determine whether or not the communications are business communications.

It should furthermore be kept in mind that interception will only be authorised if the controller of the
telecommunication system (employer) made reasonable efforts to inform potential users that interception
may take place. Also the scope of application of this Act is limited to business communication therefore
the interception of personal communications will not be legal in terms of this act.
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5.3 Conclusion
In terms of the RIP Act, LBPR and the DPA it would appear that an employer will only be authorized
to lawful intercept communications if it is done ‘in the course of transmission’. The legislature
therefore encourages UK companies to have a clearly Internet and email usage policy in place. If an
employee wants to base his/her claim on infringement of privacy, the Code of Practice will be the
most effective regulation for him/her to rely on.
6. CONLUSION
It is evident from the preceding discussion that Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom
have very different views on the protection that should be afforded to employees when dealing with
monitoring and surveillance in the workplace.
In America a pro-employer regime is applied in terms of which employees have lost all their privacy
based actions. Consequently, employees in America have no reasonable expectation of privacy. It
would appear as if American employers have an absolute immunity against the constitution, common
law and federal statutory remedies for abusive surveillance practices. In terms of American law it is
evident that everything including electronic communications on a work computer belongs to the
employer. Furthermore, business and private communications are deemed to be the property of the
employer. Therefore, employers are permitted to monitor any electronic communication even if the
employer has no e-mail and/or Internet usage policy in place which could serve to notify employees of
the fact that their electronic communications are being monitored.
In stark contrast to the American position, in the UK the monitoring and surveillance of employees are
strictly proscribed. In the EU and consequently in the UK, electronic monitoring must be reasonably
based, proportional, transparent and non-discriminatory. The European Court of Justice feels that it is
very important for companies to have written e-mail and Internet usage policies stating what the
company’s position is regarding employee surveillance and monitoring. This is in contrast with the
position in America where courts have allowed the surveillance of emails even in situations where the
company guaranteed its employees privilege and confidentiality.
The Canadian position relating to employee monitoring and surveillance fits in comfortably
somewhere between the UK and the USA. Although this country have enacted legislation regulating
employee monitoring and surveillance, with a built-in notification requirements. The biggest
deficiencies encountered in these statutes are that they only contain a notification requirement and not
a consent requirement.
The question may be asked which approach is correct? Although from a legal perspective most
academics would insist that the United Kingdom’s approach is correct, the writer is of the opinion that
the current political and social climate must play a very important role in deciding which approach a
country should take to this subject matter. Moreover, when considering the fact that a company can
incur legal liability for the illegal and inappropriate acts performed by its employees when making use
of the corporate computer resources and systems, the writer feels that an employer should have the
right to monitor e-mail and Internet usage without too many restraints being placed on him/her.
Therefore, the writer is in favor of the American position pertaining to this subject matter. Perhaps
countries such as the United Kingdom and Canada should rather ask themselves if they are not
empowering employees too much, because at the end of the day, it is still the employer’s computer
resources and systems that are being used, so why should an employer not be afforded the right to
protect its own assets through monitoring and surveillance, especially when considering the fact that
an employer can be faced with numerous lawsuit based on the inappropriate use of its computer assets
and resources?
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